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Abstract. In a deduction system with some propositions and some
known relations among these propositions, people usually care about the
minimum of propositions by which all other propositions can be deduced
according to these known relations. Here we call it a minimizing deduc-
tion system. Its common solution is the guess and determine method.
In this paper we propose a method of solving the minimizing deduction
system based on MILP. Firstly, we introduce the conceptions of state
variable, path variable and state copy, which enable us to characterize
all rules by inequalities. Then we reduce the deduction problem to a
MILP problem and solve it by the Gurobi optimizer. As its applications,
we analyze the security of two stream ciphers SNOW2.0 and Enocoro-
128v2 in resistance to guess and determine attacks. For SNOW 2.0, it is
surprising that it takes less than 0.1s to get the best solution of 9 known
variables in a personal Macbook Air(Early 2015, Double Intel Core i5
1.6GHZ, 4GB DDR3). For Enocoro-128v2, we get the best solution of
18 known variables within 3 minutes. What’s more, we propose two im-
provements to reduce the number of variables and inequalities which
significantly decrease the scale of the MILP problem.
Keywords: minimizing deduction system, guess and determine method, MILP,
SNOW 2.0, Enocoro-128v2
1 Introduction
In scientific researches, we often deduce other propositions by some propositions
and theirs relationships. Sometimes, these propositions can be derived from each
other and the relationships among them are complicated. In this situation, people
are more focused on the minimum of the number of propositions which can
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be used to deduce all other propositions. The solution of this problem can be
applied to prove some theorems in Mathematics and other fields, especially in
cryptography.
At present, a common solution of such a problem is the guess and determine
method. Its basic idea is to assume some propositions are viewed as axioms and
gradually deduce other propositions. If they can deduce all other propositions, it
is a solution. Otherwise, another propositions will be viewed as axioms and re-
peat it. In cryptography, the idea of guess and determine attack firstly appeared
in [1] which proposed a divide and conquer attack recovering the unknown initial
state from a known keystream sequence. Golic [2] applied the guess and deter-
mine attack to the alleged A5/1 and broke it theoretically. Knudsen [3] et al.
utilized it to analyze the security of RC4. In [4], Hawkes and Rose extended the
guess and determine attack from bits to words and gave a guess and determine
attack against word-oriented stream ciphers. In [5], Ekdahl et al. gave a guess
and determine attack anainst SNOW. Canniere [6] presented a guess and deter-
mine attack on SOBER [7]. In [8], Ahmadi et al. proposed a heuristic guess and
determine attack on stream cipher by means of some new rules derived form
original rules. In [9], based on local pruning and global pruning, Charles et al.
proposed a guess and determine attack on the round-reduced AES. In [10], Enes
Pasalic proposed a guess and determine method for filter generator. In [11], Wei
et al. further improved the method proposed by Enes Pasalic. In [12, 13], Feng
et al. splitted the original word units into smaller byte units and presented a
byte-based guess and determine attack to SOSEMANUK and Rabbit. Combin-
ing the idea of the guess and determine method and the time-memory tradeoff
method, they further presented realtime key or state recovering attacks against
a series of ciphers including A2U2 [14], FASER128/FASER256 [15], Sablier [16]
and PANDA-s [17]. In [18], Oleg Zaikin et al. adopted the idea of the guess and
determine method to simplify the system of equations and solved it by the SAT
optimizer.
Mixed-integer linear programming (MILP, in short) is a method to solve a
mathematical optimization problem in which some or all variables are integers
in order to get the minimum or maximum of an objective function. It has been
wildly used in business and economics. It was introduced to compute the num-
ber of active S-boxes in differential and linear cryptanalysis by Mouha et al. [19]
and Wu et al. [20] respectively. Since then, MILP began to appear in crypt-
analysis frequently and became a powerful automatic search tool. In [21], Sun
et al. extended Mouha et al.s method for block ciphers with S-bP structure by
introducing new representations for exclusive-or (XOR) differences to describe
bit/word level differences simultaneously and by taking the collaborative diffu-
sion effect of S-boxes and bitwise permutations into account. In [22, 23], they
further presented a MILP-based automatic method for finding high probability
(related-key) differential or linear characteristics of block ciphers. In [24], Fu et
al. extended the tool of MILP to ARX ciphers. In [25], Cui et al. proposed a
new automatic search tool for impossible differentials and zero-correlation linear
approximations. Revealing structural properties of several ciphers from design
and cryptanalysis aspects, Yu Sasaki and Yosuke Todo gave a new impossible
differential search tool in [26]. Recently, Shi et al. broke the full-round MORUS
by means of the MILP tool [27].
In this work we recall the conception of a minimizing deduction system and
propose a novel method of solving it based on MILP solver. Firstly, in order
to characterize all rules by inequalities, we introduce the conceptions of state
variable, path variable and state copy. Then we reduce the deduction problem
to a MILP problem and solve it by the Gurobi optimizer. As its applications,
we analyze the security of two stream ciphers SNOW 2.0 [33] and Enocoro-
128v2 [40] in resistance to guess and determine attacks. To our surprise, it takes
less than 0.01s to get the best solution that only 9 known variables can be used
to deduce all other variables for SNOW 2.0 in a personal Macbook Air(11-inch,
Early 2015, Double Intel Core i5 1.6GHZ, 4GB DDR3). For Enocoro-128v2, we
get the best solution within 3 minutes that only 18 konwn variables can be used
to deduce all other variables. What’s more, we propose two improvements to
reduce the number of variables and inequalities which significantly decrease the
scale of the MILP problem.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: in section 2, we briefly re-
call some preliminaries about MILP and the minimizing deduction system; in
section 3, some conceptions of state variable, path variable and state copy are
introduced, which enable us to characterize rules by inequalities; in section 4, as
its applications, we give guess and determine attacks against two stream ciphers
SNOW 2.0 and Enocoro-128v2; in section 5, we further propose two improve-
ments to reduce the number of variables and inequalities.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Description of a minimizing deduction system
A deduction system is usually represented as a 2-tuple (P,R), where P is a set
of some propositions and R is a set of some relations among these propositions.
In the rest of this paper, we call these relations as rules. A rule tells us what
propositions a proposition can be derived from. Sometimes, a proposition may
be derived from serval rules in a deduction system. For example, let (P,R) be
a deduction system of 4 propositions and 5 rules. Without loss of generality,
denote P = (p1, p2, p3, p4) and R = (r1, r2, r3, r4, r5), where p1, p2, p3, p4 are
propositions, and r1, r2, r3, r4, r5 are rules:
r1 : p2 ⇒ p1,
r2 : p3, p4 ⇒ p1,
r3 : p1, p3 ⇒ p2,
r4 : p1, p4 ⇒ p3,
r5 : p1, p2 ⇒ p4.
In the above deduction system, the proposition p1 can be derived from two rules
r1 and r2, that is, p1 is derived by p2 in r1, and by p3 and p4 in r2. Most of
the time, people concern how many propositions, especially the minimum of
the number of propositions, can deduce all other propositions in a deduction
system. In this paper we call it a minimizing deduction system. As for the above
deduction system, it is easy to check the minimum of propositions which can
be used to deduce all other propositions is 1. Indeed we can deduce all other
propositions by the proposition p2 as below:
Fig. 1. A deduction course by the proposition p2
2.2 MILP
The MILP problem is a mathematical optimization problem in which some or all
variables are limited to integers. It contains three parts: an objective function,
constraint conditions and decision variables. A MILP problem [29] generally can
be formalized as follows:
Max. or Min. cTx
s.t. Ax ≤ b
x =
[
p
q
]
, p ∈ Zk, q ∈ R(n−k),
where Z and R are denoted the set of all integers and reals respectively, n, m and
k are three positive integers, c is a column vector in the n-dimensional vector
space Rn, x is a column vector in Rn in which k variables are limited to integers,
A is a full-rank metrix in Rm×n, b is a column vector in Rm. For a specific
MILP problem, we can solve it by means of some mathematical softwares such
as Gurobi [30], Cplex [31] and MiniSat [32].
3 The characterization of inequality
3.1 State variable, path variable and state copy
For a given deduction system (P,R), where P = (p1, p2, · · · , pn) and R =
(r1, r2, · · · , rm), here we will consider how to characterize it by inequalities.
Firstly, we assume that the deduction system can be deduced by k propositions,
where k is an integer such that 1 ≤ k ≤ n. For convenience, we describe a propo-
sition pi(1 ≤ i ≤ n) as a state variable xi. If a proposition pi belongs to these k
propositions or those deduced by these k propositions, we call its corresponding
state variable xi is known, denoted by 1. Otherwise, we call it unknown, denoted
by 0. Sometimes a proposition pi maybe deduced by several rules ri1 , ri2 , · · · , riτ ,
where τ is an integer such that τ ≥ 2, 1 ≤ ij ≤ m, 1 ≤ j ≤ τ . In this case we
call each rule rij as a path of pi, denoted by a path variable li,j , 1 ≤ j ≤ τ . If
the proposition pi can be deduced by the rule rij , we call the path variable li,j
is known, denoted by 1. Otherwise, we call it unknown, denoted by 0.
In order to depict the deduction system by the MILP method, we introduce
a concept of state copy. Let X = (x1, x2, · · · , xn) be a state of the deduction
system (P,R). We callX ′ = (x′1, x′2, · · · , x′n) a state copy of the stateX if x′i ≥ xi
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. It is easy to see that if some state variable xi is known, then x′i
is also known after the state copy. When xi is unknown, x
′
i maybe become known
if the proposition pi can be deduced from the known propositions indicated in
X. In the next two sections we will simulate the course of deduction by the state
copy.
3.2 The inequalities of the state variables
For a state variable x, denote by l1, l2, · · · , lτ its corresponding path variables.
Then x is determined uniquely by l1, l2, · · · , lτ . It is easy to see that x is known
if and only if at least one of l1, l2, · · · , lτ is known. If all li’s are unknown, x will
be also unknown. The relationship of the state variable x and its path variables
l1, l2, · · · , lτ is shown in Table 1.
Table 1. The relationship of x, l1, l2, · · · , lτ .
No. x l1, l2, · · · , lτ Permission
1 1 Not all 0 X
2 0 All 0 X
3 0 Not all 0 ×
4 1 All 0 ×
Below we consider to characterize the relationship in Table 1 by inequalities
of the form
ax+
τ∑
i=1
bili + c ≥ 0. (1)
For simplification, here we assume that all bi(i = 1, 2, · · · , τ) are equal to b.
According to the conditions 1, 2 and 3 in Table 1, we get the following inequality
group: 
a+ bl
′
+ c ≥ 0
c ≥ 0
bl
′′
+ c < 0
(2)
for all 1 ≤ l′ , l′′ ≤ τ . It is easy to check that a > 0, b < 0 and c ≥ 0. Thus the
inequality group (2) is equivalent to the following inequality group in which l
′
and l
′′
are taken τ and 1 respectively:
a+ bτ + c ≥ 0
c ≥ 0
b+ c < 0
(3)
Apparently, a = τ, b = −1, c = 0 is a solution of the inequality group (3).
Thus the conditions 1, 2 and 3 can be characterized by the following inequality:
τx−
τ∑
i=1
li ≥ 0. (4)
Similarly, we have the inequality for the conditions 1, 2 and 4 in Table 1:
− 2x+
τ∑
i=1
li + 1 ≥ 0. (5)
So we get the following theorem which characterizes all conditions in Table
1 completely.
Theorem 1. Let x be a state variable and l1, l2, · · · , lτ (τ ≥ 1) be its correspond-
ing τ path variables. Then their relationship can be characterized by the following
inequality group: 
−2x+
τ∑
i=1
li + 1 ≥ 0
τx−
τ∑
i=1
li ≥ 0
(6)
Proof. The conclusion directly follows by the above deducing procedure. 
Remark 1: When τ = 1, we can characterize the relationship between x and
l1 by one simpler equality x = l1.
3.3 The inequalities of the path variables
For a given rule r
x1, x2, · · · , xκ ⇒ x,
we introduce a path variable l for x. Then l is determined uniquely by the state
variables x1, x2, · · · , xκ. Indeed we have l is known if and only if all xi’s are
known. If at least one of xi’s is unknown, then l is unknown. Table 2 shows the
relationship of the path variable l and its state variables x1, x2, · · · , xκ. As for
their relationship, we have the following theorem.
Table 2. The relationship of l, x1, x2, · · · , xκ.
No l x1, x2, · · · , xκ Permission
1 1 All 1 X
2 0 Not all 1 X
3 0 All 1 ×
4 1 Not all 1 ×
Theorem 2. Let l be a path variable and x1, x2, · · · , xκ(κ ≥ 1) be its corre-
sponding κ state variables. Then their relationship can be characterized by the
following inequality group: 
l −
κ∑
i=1
xi + (κ− 1) ≥ 0
−κl +
κ∑
i=1
xi ≥ 0
(7)
Proof. Let
U = l −
κ∑
i=1
xi + (κ− 1),
V = −κl +
κ∑
i=1
xi.
When l = 1 and all x1, x2, · · · , xκ are 1 or l = 0 and not all x1, x2, · · · , xκ
are 1, the value of U and V are always not less than 0. That means the in-
equality group (7) meets the conditions 1 and 2 of Table 2. When l = 0 and all
x1, x2, · · · , xκ are 1, the value of U is −1. When l = 1 and not all x1, x2, · · · , xκ
are 1, the maximum of V is −1. Therefore, all possible l, x1, x2, · · · , xκ satisfying
the conditions 3 and 4 in Table 2 do not meet the inequality group (7). This
completes the proof. 
Remark 2: When κ = 1, we can characterize the relationship between l and
x1 by one simpler equality l = x1.
3.4 Initial condition and objective function
For a given deduction system (P,R) of n propositions and m rules, we assume
that at most k propositions are viewed as axioms. Let X0 = (x
(0)
1 , x
(0)
2 , · · · , x(0)n )
be an initial state of the deduction system (P,R). Then we have the initial
condition:
x
(0)
1 + x
(0)
2 + · · ·+ x(0)n ≤ k (8)
In order to simulate the deduction course, we conduct the state copy. Let
X1, X2, · · · , Xν be the state sequence, where Xi = (x(i)1 , x(i)2 , · · · , x(i)n ), 1 ≤ i ≤
ν, ν is a positive integer, and Xi is the state copy of Xi−1. If a state variable x
in Xi−1 is known, then it is also known in Xi. If it is unknown in Xi−1 but it
can be deduced by other known state variables in Xi−1 according to the rules
R, then it is known in Xi. After the state copy ν times, we expect the 1’s in Xν
as many as possible, that is:
Max. x
(ν)
1 + x
(ν)
2 + · · ·+ x(ν)n . (9)
Obviously,X0 = (x
(0)
1 , x
(0)
2 , · · · , x(0)n ) is a solution of the deduction system (P,R)
when x
(ν)
1 + x
(ν)
2 + · · ·+ x(ν)n = n.
4 Applications to stream ciphers
4.1 SNOW 2.0
SNOW 2.0 [33] is a strengthened version of SNOW [5] which is a candidate of
the NESSIE and has been broken by the guess and determine attack [34] and
the distinguishing attack [35]. At present SNOW 2.0 become one of the most
important stream ciphers and is selected to be an international standard by
ISO/IEC 18033-4 [36]. Below we recall SNOW 2.0 briefly. Please refer to [33] for
more details.
4.1.1 Description of SNOW 2.0
The stream cipher SNOW 2.0 consists of a Linear Feedback Shift Register
(LFSR) and a Finite State Machine (FSM) as shown in Fig. 2. Here we denote
by⊕ and the bitwise addition and the integer addition modulo 232 respectively,
and by α a root of the polynomial x4 + β23x3 + β245x2 + β48x+ β239 ∈ F28 [x],
where β is a root of the polynomial x8 + x7 + x5 + x3 + 1 ∈ F2 [x]. Let α−1 be
the inverse of α, and S be a permutation on Z232 based on the round function
of Rijndael [37]. We have the following iterative relations:
st+16 = α
−1 · st+11 ⊕ st+2 ⊕ α · st
zt = st+15 R1t ⊕R2t ⊕ st
R1t+1 = st+5 R2t
R2t+1 = S(R1t)
(10)
where t ≥ 0, t ∈ Z, and zt is the output key word. We always assume that the
sequence {zt}t≥0 is known in the context of a guess and determine attack.
4.1.2 Inequality characterization of SNOW 2.0
In our minimizing deduction system, since we mainly focus on whether a variable
is known or not rather than its certain value, we indicate by a state variable
Fig. 2. A schematic picture of SNOW 2.0
whether the value of some register unit is known or not. Without confusion, we
still adopt the same symbol to indicate the state variable of some register unit,
for example, the state variable st is used to indicate the state of the LFSR unit
st. If the value of the LFSR unit st is known, then set the state variable st = 1,
otherwise, set st = 0. It is noticed that all variables in every formula of the
iterative relations (10) are symmetrical, that is, each variable can be deduced
by the other variables. Below we denote a rule by [x1, x2, · · · , xκ], where xi is a
state variable, 1 ≤ i ≤ κ, which means each xi in [x1, x2, · · · , xκ] can be deduced
by the other (κ− 1) state variables and is called a symmetrical rule. Therefore
we can get all rules by the iterative relations (10) as follows:
[st+16, st+11, st+2, st]
[st+15, R1t, R2t, st]
[R1t+1, st+5, R2t]
[R2t+1, R1t]
(11)
where t ≥ 0, t ∈ Z. Note that [R2t+1, R1t] means one is known if and only if
the other is also known, we always have R2t+1 = R1t for an arbitrary t ≥ 0.
Therefore we can eliminate some state variables to further simplify the rules (11)
and get the following rules: 
[st+16, st+11, st+2, st]
[st+15, R2t+1, R2t, st]
[R2t+2, st+5, R2t]
(12)
Rewriting R2 as R, we can get the following rules:
[st+16, st+11, st+2, st] (13-1)
[st+15, Rt+1, Rt, st] (13-2)
[Rt+2, st+5, Rt] (13-3)
Assuming that totally T key words z0, z1, · · · , zT−1 are known in a guess and
determine attack, where T ≥ 1. Thus we get the state X of all state variables in
SNOW 2.0:
X = (s0, s1, s2, · · · , s14+T , R0, R1, · · · , RT ),
which contains (2T + 16) state variables. We repeat the state copy ν times and
get a state sequence {Xi}0≤i≤ν :
X(i) = (s
(i)
0 , s
(i)
1 , s
(i)
2 , · · · , s(i)14+T , R(i)0 , R(i)1 , · · · , R(i)T ).
For any 0 ≤ i ≤ ν− 1, below we consider how many rules each state variable
in Xi+1 can be deduced from Xi by. Take the state variable s
(i+1)
11 for example,
where we assume that T ≥ 13. By the state copy of Xi and the rules (13-1),
(13-2) and (13-3), we get all 6 rules deducing s
(i+1)
11 :
{s(i)11 },
{R(i)6 , R(i)8 },
{s(i)13 , s(i)22 , s(i)27 },
{R(i)11 , R(i)12 , s(i)26 },
{s(i)9 , s(i)20 , s(i)25 },
{s(i)0 , s(i)2 , s(i)16 }.
For the above each rule, we introduce a path variable s
(i+1)
11,j , 1 ≤ j ≤ 6. By
Theorems 1 and 2, we get a characterization on the update of s11.

s
(i+1)
11,1 − s(i)11 = 0
s
(i+1)
11,5 −R(i)6 −R(i)8 + 1 ≥ 0
−2s(i+1)11,5 +R(i)6 +R(i)8 ≥ 0
s
(i+1)
11,2 − s(i)13 − s(i)22 − s(i)27 + 2 ≥ 0
−3s(i+1)11,2 + s(i)13 + s(i)22 + s(i)27 ≥ 0
s
(i+1)
11,3 −R(i)11 −R(i)12 − s(i)26 + 2 ≥ 0
−3s(i+1)11,3 +R(i)11 +R(i)12 + s(i)26 ≥ 0
s
(i+1)
11,4 − s(i)9 − s(i)20 − s(i)25 + 2 ≥ 0
−3s(i+1)11,4 + s(i)9 + s(i)20 + s(i)25 ≥ 0
s
(i+1)
11,6 − s(i)0 − s(i)2 − s(i)16 + 2 ≥ 0
−3s(i+1)11,6 + s(i)0 + s(i)2 + s(i)16 ≥ 0
−2s(i+1)11 +
6∑
j=1
s
(i+1)
11,j + 1 ≥ 0
6s
(i+1)
11 −
6∑
j=1
s
(i+1)
11,j ≥ 0
(14)
For the other state variables in Xi+1, please refer to Appendix A.
Here we assume that at most k state variables in the initial state X0 are
known. Then we have the initial constraint condition
14+T∑
i=0
s
(0)
i +
T∑
i=0
R
(0)
i ≤ k, (15)
and the objective function
Max.
14+T∑
i=0
s
(ν)
i +
T∑
i=0
R
(ν)
i . (16)
4.1.3 Experimental result
In our experiment, we take T = 13, ν = 12 and k = 9 and solve it by the Gurobi
optimizer. It is surprising that it takes less than 0.1s to get the best solution of 9
known variables: R4, R5, R6, R7, R8, R9, R10, R11, R12. The deduction course of
all other variables are given in Table 3 according to the result of the Gurobi
optimizer.
Table 3. The deduction course of state variables in SNOW 2.0
No. Known Rule Deduced No. Known Rule Deduced
1 R4, R6 13-3 s9 18 s10, s19, s24 13-1 s8
2 R5, R7 13-3 s10 19 s8, R8, R9 13-2 s23
3 R6, R8 13-3 s11 20 s8, R5 13-3 R3
4 R7, R9 13-3 s12 21 s3, R3, R4 13-2 s18
5 R8, R10 13-3 s13 22 s6, R3 13-3 R1
6 R9, R11 13-3 s14 23 s4, s13, s18 13-1 s2
7 R10, R12 13-3 s15 24 s9, s18, s23 13-1 s7
8 s9, R9, R10 13-2 s24 25 s5, s7, s21 13-1 s16
9 s10, R10, R11 13-2 s25 26 s7, R7, R8 13-2 s22
10 s11, R11, R12 13-2 s26 27 s7, R4 13-3 R2
11 s9, s11, s25 13-1 s20 28 s2, s11, s16 13-1 s0
12 s10, s12, s26 13-1 s21 29 s6, s8, s22 13-1 s17
13 s20, R5, R6 13-2 s5 30 s11, s13, s22 13-1 s27
14 s21, R6, R7 13-2 s6 31 s16, R1, R2 13-2 s1
15 s6, s15, s20 13-1 s4 32 s5, R2 13-3 R0
16 s4, R4, R5 13-2 s19 33 s16, R11 13-3 R13
17 s5, s14, s19 13-1 s3
4.2 Enocoro-128v2
Enocoro is a family of stream ciphers whose common specification firstly was
published in [38]. We mainly focus on Enocoro-128v2 [40] in this paper. Sine
the update function of Enocoro-128v2 is the same as Enocoro-128v1.1 [39], our
method have the same effect on both. Below we only give a short description of
Enocoro-128v2. More details are in [40,41].
4.2.1 Description of Enocoro-128v2
Enocoro-128v2 consists of four LFSR and a FSM as shown in Fig.3. The substi-
tution box s8 defines a permutation which maps 8-bits inputs to 8-bits outputs.
Here we don’t care about the inner details of s8. The linear transformation L is
defined by a 2× 2 matrix over GF(28):
(
v0
v1
)
= L(u0, u1) =
(
1 1
1 2
)(
u0
u1
)
. (17)
According to the above expression, it is known that as long as arbitrary two
values of v0, v1, u0, u1 are known, the other two values will be calculated. For
the convenience of description, we redraw Fig. 3 as Fig. 4. As for Enocono-128v2,
we have the following iterative relations:
Fig. 3. The structure of Enocoro-128v2
Fig. 4. The equivalent structure of Enocoro-128v2

bt+3 = at ⊕ et
ct+5 = bt ⊕ ct+1
dt+9 = ct ⊕ dt+1
et+15 = dt ⊕ et+3(
at+1 ⊕ s8(dt)
zt+1 ⊕ s8(et+2)
)
= L
(
at ⊕ s8(bt)
zt ⊕ s8(ct)
) (18)
where t ≥ 0, t ∈ Z and zt is the output key word. We always assume that the
sequence {zt}t≥0 is known in the context of a guess and determine attack.
4.2.2 Inequality characterization of Enocoro-128v2
The course of translating iterative relations (18) into rules is similar to SNOW
2.0. The only different part is how to handle the operation of the linear transform
L. Here we introduce two variables ft and gt where ft = at ⊕ s8(bt), gt =
at+1 ⊕ s8(dt). The iterative relations (18) can be translated as the following:
bt+3 = at ⊕ et
ct+5 = bt ⊕ ct+1
dt+9 = ct ⊕ dt+1
et+15 = dt ⊕ et+3
ft = at ⊕ s8(bt)
gt = at+1 ⊕ s8(dt)(
gt
zt+1 ⊕ s8(et+2)
)
= L
(
ft
zt ⊕ s8(ct)
)
(19)
Since zt and zt+1 are known variables and S8 is a known permutation, we
omit them in our minimizing deduction system. For the linear transformation L,
as long as we know two variables in this transformation, the other two variables
can be deduced. Therefore we have the following rules:
[bt+3, at, et] (20-1)
[ct+5, bt, ct+1] (20-2)
[dt+9, ct, dt+1] (20-3)
[et+15, dt, et+3] (20-4)
[ft, at, bt] (20-5)
[gt, at+1, dt] (20-6)
[gt, ft, et+2] (20-7)
[gt, ft, ct] (20-8)
[gt, et+2, ct] (20-9)
[ft, et+2, ct] (20-10)
Assuming that totally T key words z0, z1, · · · , zT−1 are known in a guess and
determine attack, where T ≥ 2. Thus we get the state X of all state variables in
Enocoro-128v2:
X =(a0, · · · , aT−1, b0, · · · , bT−2, c0, · · · , cT−2, d0, · · · , dT−2,
e0, · · · , eT , f0, · · · , fT−2, g0, · · · , gT−2),
which contains (7T − 4) state variables. We repeat the state copy ν times and
get a state sequence {Xi}0≤i≤ν :
X(i) =(a
(i)
0 , · · · , a(i)T−1, b(i)0 , · · · , b(i)T−2, c(i)0 , · · · , cT−2,(i) d(i)0 , · · · , d(i)T−2,
e
(i)
0 , · · · , e(i)T , f (i)0 , · · · , f (i)T−2, g0, · · · , g(i)T−2).
For every state variables in X, since their inequality characterization is sim-
ilar to SNOW 2.0 by Theorems 1 and 2, we don’t repeat them. Please refer to
Appendix B for more details.
Here we assume that at most k state variables in the initial state X0 are
known. Then we have the initial constraint condition
T−1∑
i=0
a
(0)
i +
T−2∑
i=0
b
(0)
i +
T−2∑
i=0
c
(0)
i +
T−2∑
i=0
d
(0)
i +
T∑
i=0
e
(0)
i +
T−2∑
i=0
f
(0)
i +
T−2∑
i=0
g
(0)
i ≤ k, (21)
and the objective function
Max.
T−1∑
i=0
a
(ν)
i +
T−2∑
i=0
b
(ν)
i +
T−2∑
i=0
c
(ν)
i +
T−2∑
i=0
d
(ν)
i +
T∑
i=0
e
(ν)
i +
T−2∑
i=0
f
(ν)
i +
T−2∑
i=0
g
(ν)
i . (22)
4.2.3 Experimental result
In our experiment, we take T = 16, ν = 18 and k = 18 and solve it by the
Gurobi optimizer. It takes about 3 minutes to get a current best solution of 18
known variables: a3, a5, b2, b5, b6, c2, c3, c8, c9, c10, e6, e11, e15, f3, f6, g1, g2 g5,
whose objective function reaches 92. We find they indeed are a group of solutions
by verification. The deduction course of all other variables are given in Table 4
according to the result of the Gurobi optimizer.
Our result is better than that in [42] which has to guess 20-22 variables in
total and is the same as in [43]. However, we don’t have access to this paper
since it is in Japanese.
5 Two improvements
5.1 The reduction of path variables and inequalities
In this section we will improve the minimizing deduction system by reducing the
number of path variables and inequalities. In the previous description, a state
variable is determined by its corresponding path variables which consist of tow
parts: one from the state copy and the others from some rules. We find that for
the update of each state variable x, at least 2 path variables which come from
the state copy and some rule respectively can be reduced. More concretely, let x
be a state variable and l1, l2, · · · , lτ be its corresponding path variables, where l1
is from the state copy. We suppose that lτ is determined by the state variables
x1, x2, · · · , xκ. Denote by x′ the variable copy of x. Then the relation between
x′ and x, l2, · · · , lτ−1, x1, x2, · · · , xκ is shown in Table 5. We have the following
conclusion:
Theorem 3. Let x′ be a copy of the state variable x, l2, · · · , lτ be path variables
corresponding to x. Denote by x1, x2, · · · , xκ the state variables of lτ . Then they
Table 4. The deduction courses of variables of Enocoro-128v2
NO. Known Rule Ded. NO. Known Rule Ded. NO. Known Rule Ded.
1 a3, b6 20-1 e3 34 c1, d2 20-3 d10 66 c10, g10 20-9 e12
2 b2, c3 20-2 c7 35 c4, d5 20-3 d13 67 a10, f10 20-5 b10
3 b5, c10 20-2 c6 36 b1, f1 20-5 a1 68 b10, e7 20-1 a7
4 a3, f3 20-5 b3 37 b9, f9 20-5 a9 69 b10, c11 20-2 c15
5 a5, b5 20-5 f5 38 a2, g1 20-6 d1 70 a7, b7 20-5 f7
6 b6, f6 20-5 a6 39 c4, e6 20-9 g4 71 a7, g6 20-6 d6
7 a3, g2 20-6 d2 40 c4, e6 20-10 f4 72 c15, e17 20-9 g15
8 c2, g2 20-8 f2 41 a1, b4 20-1 e1 73 c15, e17 20-10 f15
9 c3, f3 20-8 g3 42 d1, e4 20-4 e16 74 c5, d6 20-3 d14
10 c2, g2 20-9 e4 43 b4, f4 20-5 a4 75 c7, f7 20-8 g7
11 c9, e11 20-9 g9 44 a1, d0 20-6 g0 76 c7, f7 20-10 e9
12 c3, f3 20-10 e5 45 a5, g4 20-6 d4 77 a9, e9 20-1 b12
13 c9, e11 20-10 f9 46 c13, e15 20-9 g13 78 d14, g14 20-6 a15
14 a5, e5 20-1 b8 47 c13, e15 20-10 f13 79 a15, f15 20-5 b15
15 a6, e6 20-1 b9 48 a4, e4 20-1 b7 80 b15, e12 20-1 a12
16 c2, c6 20-2 b1 49 c3, d4 20-3 d12 81 a12, b12 20-5 f12
17 b3, c8 20-2 c4 50 a4, g3 20-6 d3 82 a12, d11 20-6 g11
18 b6, c7 20-2 c11 51 d13, g13 20-6 a14 83 c11, g11 20-8 f11
19 e3, e15 20-4 d0 52 e2, g0 20-7 f0 84 c12, f12 20-8 g12
20 d2, e5 20-4 e17 53 e2, g0 20-9 c0 85 c11, g11 20-9 e13
21 b2, f2 20-5 a2 54 c14, e16 20-9 g14 86 c12, f12 20-10 e14
22 a6, g5 20-6 d5 55 c14, e16 20-10 f14 87 a11, f11 20-5 b11
23 e3, g1 20-7 f1 56 b7, c8 20-2 c12 88 d12, g12 20-6 a13
24 f5, g5 20-7 e7 57 c0, d1 20-3 d9 89 b11, e8 20-1 a8
25 f5, g5 20-8 c5 58 c2, d3 20-3 d11 90 a13, f13 20-5 b13
26 c6, f6 20-8 g6 59 b0, f0 20-5 a0 91 a10, b13 20-1 e10
27 e3, g1 20-9 c1 60 a14, f14 20-5 b14 92 a8, b8 20-5 f8
28 c6, f6 20-10 e8 61 a0, b3 20-1 e0 93 a8, g7 20-6 d7
29 a2, b5 20-1 e2 62 b14, e11 20-1 a11 94 c6, d7 20-3 d15
30 c1, c5 20-2 b0 63 d9, g9 20-6 a10 95 e10, f8 20-7 g8
31 c5, c9 20-2 b4 64 a11, d10 20-6 g10 96 a9, g8 20-6 d8
32 b8, c9 20-2 c13 65 c10, g10 20-8 f10 97 d15, g15 20-6 a16
33 b9, c10 20-2 c14
Table 5. The relationship of x′, x, l2, · · · , lτ−1, x1, x2, · · · , xκ.
No. x′ x, l2, · · · , lτ−1 x1, x2, · · · , xκ permission
1 1 Not all 0 N/A X
2 1 N/A All 1 X
3 0 All 0 Not all 1 X
4 1 All 0 Not all 1 ×
5 0 Not all 0 N/A ×
6 0 N/A All 1 ×
are characterized by the following inequality group:
((τ − 1)κ+ 1)x′ − κ(x+
τ−1∑
i=2
li)−
κ∑
i=1
xi + κ− 1 ≥ 0
−κx′ + κ(x+
τ−1∑
i=2
li) +
κ∑
i=1
xi ≥ 0
(23)
Proof. Similarly to the proof of theorem 2, let
U = ((τ − 1)κ+ 1)x′ − κ(x+
τ−1∑
i=2
li)−
κ∑
i=1
xi + κ− 1,
V = −κx′ + κ(x+
τ−1∑
i=2
li) +
κ∑
i=1
xi.
It is easy to check that the value of U and V are always no less than 0 when
x′ = 1 and not all x, l2, · · · , lτ−1 are 0 or x′ = x1 = x2 = · · · = xκ = 1 or
x′ = x = l2 = · · · = lτ−1 = 0 and not all x1, x2, · · · , xκ are 1. That means the
inequality group (23) meets the conditions 1, 2 and 3 of Table 5. When x′ = 1,
x = l2 = · · · = lτ−1 = 0 and not all x1, x2, · · · , xκ are 1, the maximum of V
is −1. When x′ = 0 and not all x, l2, · · · , lτ−1 are 0, the maximum of U is −1.
When x′ = 0 and x1 = x2 = · · · = xκ = 1, the maximum of U is −1. Therefore,
all possible x′, x, l2, · · · , lτ−1, x1, · · · , xκ satisfying the conditions 4, 5 and 6 in
Table 5 don’t meet the inequality group (23). This completes the proof. 
By Theorem 3, it is known that for the update of each state variable, two
path variables and three inequalities are reduced from the inequality group. As
for SNOW 2.0 and Enocoro-128v2, the former is reduced totally (4T +32)ν path
variables and (6T + 48)ν inequalities, and the latter totally (14T − 8)ν path
variables and (21T − 12)ν inequalities.
5.2 The elimination of state variables and rules
5.2.1 Rules with two variables
In this section we only consider the rules including two variables. Let r be
a rule with x1 and x2. If x1 and x2 can be derived from each other, we always
have x1 = x2. Therefore we can eliminate one of x1 and x2 and the rule r.
In fact, this improvement has been used in the inequality characterization of
SNOW 2.0 in section 4.1, where totally 11 variables and 11 rules are reduced.
5.2.2 Independent state variables and their rules
In a deduction system, we call a variable x to be independent if it is only used
in a rule r. Here we assume that the rule r contains exactly one independent
variable and discuss it in two cases:
– the independent variable x belongs to a symmetrical rule r:
[x, x1, x2, · · · , xτ−1]. (24)
In this case, we can eliminate x and r. That is because: 1) If x is unknown
and can be deduced by r, since x only appears in r, it must be deduced by
r and the other variables in r should be known initially or deduced by other
rules. Obviously, when x and r are removed from the deduction system, it
doesn’t affect the other variables in r. 2) If x is known in the initial state X0,
when r is used, there exists a variable in r expect x deduced by r. We denote
it by x1. Take an initial state X
′
0, where x = 0, x1 = 1 and the values of the
others variables in X ′0 are the same as those in X0. Obviously, the deduction
course of X0 and X
′
0 is the same expect r. Note that |X0| = |X ′0|, where |X|
means the number of 1 in X, if X0 is a solution of the deduction system, X
′
0
is also its solution, vice versa. Thus it does not change the minimum of the
deduction system when x and r are removed.
– the independent variable x belongs to the following rule:
x1, x2, · · · , xτ−1 ⇒ xτ , (25)
which means the right variables xj can be deduced by the left variables
x1, x2, · · · , xτ−1. If x is one of the left variables, it must be known in the
initial state X0. If x = xτ , since x only can be deduced by r, it does not
affect the other deduction courses except r when x and r are removed from
the deduction system.
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A State variables and theirs paths of SNOW 2.0 with
T = 13
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(i)
21 , s
(i)
10 },{s
(i)
27 , R
(i)
13 , R
(i)
12 },{R
(i)
7 , R
(i)
9 } 5
s
(i+1)
13 {s
(i)
13 },{s
(i)
18 , s
(i)
4 , s
(i)
2 },{s
(i)
27 , s
(i)
22 , s
(i)
11 },{R
(i)
8 , R
(i)
10 } 4
s
(i+1)
14 {s
(i)
14 },{s
(i)
19 , s
(i)
5 , s
(i)
3 },{R
(i)
9 , R
(i)
11 } 3
s
(i+1)
15 {s
(i)
15 },{s
(i)
20 , s
(i)
6 , s
(i)
4 },{R
(i)
1 , R
(i)
0 , s
(i)
0 },{R
(i)
10 , R
(i)
12 } 4
s
(i+1)
16 {s
(i)
16 },{s
(i)
11 , s
(i)
2 , s
(i)
0 },{s
(i)
21 , s
(i)
7 , s
(i)
5 },{R
(i)
2 , R
(i)
1 , s
(i)
1 },{R
(i)
11 , R
(i)
13 } 5
s
(i+1)
17 {s
(i)
17 },{s
(i)
12 , s
(i)
3 , s
(i)
1 },{s
(i)
22 , s
(i)
8 , s
(i)
6 },{R
(i)
3 , R
(i)
2 , s
(i)
2 } 4
s
(i+1)
18 {s
(i)
18 },{s
(i)
13 , s
(i)
4 , s
(i)
2 },{s
(i)
23 , s
(i)
9 , s
(i)
7 },{R
(i)
4 , R
(i)
3 , s
(i)
3 } 4
s
(i+1)
19 {s
(i)
19 },{s
(i)
14 , s
(i)
5 , s
(i)
3 },{s
(i)
24 , s
(i)
10 , s
(i)
8 },{R
(i)
5 , R
(i)
4 , s
(i)
4 } 4
s
(i+1)
20 {s
(i)
20 },{s
(i)
15 , s
(i)
6 , s
(i)
4 },{s
(i)
25 , s
(i)
11 , s
(i)
9 },{R
(i)
6 , R
(i)
5 , s
(i)
5 } 4
s
(i+1)
21 {s
(i)
21 },{s
(i)
16 , s
(i)
7 , s
(i)
5 },{s
(i)
26 , s
(i)
12 , s
(i)
10 },{R
(i)
7 , R
(i)
6 , s
(i)
6 } 4
s
(i+1)
22 {s
(i)
22 },{s
(i)
17 , s
(i)
8 , s
(i)
6 },{s
(i)
27 , s
(i)
13 , s
(i)
11 },{R
(i)
8 , R
(i)
7 , s
(i)
7 } 4
s
(i+1)
23 {s
(i)
23 },{s
(i)
18 , s
(i)
9 , s
(i)
7 },{R
(i)
9 , R
(i)
8 , s
(i)
8 } 3
s
(i+1)
24 {s
(i)
24 },{s
(i)
19 , s
(i)
10 , s
(i)
8 },{R
(i)
10 , R
(i)
9 , s
(i)
9 } 3
s
(i+1)
25 {s
(i)
25 },{s
(i)
20 , s
(i)
11 , s
(i)
9 },{R
(i)
11 , R
(i)
10 , s
(i)
10 } 3
s
(i+1)
26 {s
(i)
26 },{s
(i)
21 , s
(i)
12 , s
(i)
10 },{R
(i)
12 , R
(i)
11 , s
(i)
11 } 3
s
(i+1)
27 {s
(i)
27 },{s
(i)
22 , s
(i)
13 , s
(i)
11 },{R
(i)
13 , R
(i)
12 , s
(i)
12 } 3
R
(i+1)
0 {R
(i)
0 },{s
(i)
15 , R
(i)
1 , s
(i)
0 },{s
(i)
5 , R
(i)
2 } 3
R
(i+1)
1 {R
(i)
1 },{s
(i)
15 , R
(i)
0 , s
(i)
0 },{s
(i)
16 , R
(i)
2 , s
(i)
1 },{s
(i)
6 , R
(i)
3 } 4
R
(i+1)
2 {R
(i)
2 },{s
(i)
16 , R
(i)
1 , s
(i)
1 },{s
(i)
17 , R
(i)
3 , s
(i)
2 },{s
(i)
7 , R
(i)
4 },{s
(i)
5 , R
(i)
0 } 5
R
(i+1)
3 {R
(i)
3 },{s
(i)
17 , R
(i)
2 , s
(i)
2 },{s
(i)
18 , R
(i)
4 , s
(i)
3 },{s
(i)
8 , R
(i)
5 },{s
(i)
6 , R
(i)
1 } 5
R
(i+1)
4 {R
(i)
4 },{s
(i)
18 , R
(i)
3 , s
(i)
3 },{s
(i)
19 , R
(i)
5 , s
(i)
4 },{s
(i)
9 , R
(i)
6 },{s
(i)
7 , R
(i)
2 } 5
R
(i+1)
5 {R
(i)
5 },{s
(i)
19 , R
(i)
4 , s
(i)
4 },{s
(i)
20 , R
(i)
6 , s
(i)
5 },{s
(i)
10 , R
(i)
7 },{s
(i)
8 , R
(i)
3 } 5
R
(i+1)
6 {R
(i)
6 },{s
(i)
20 , R
(i)
5 , s
(i)
5 },{s
(i)
21 , R
(i)
7 , s
(i)
6 },{s
(i)
11 , R
(i)
8 },{s
(i)
9 , R
(i)
4 } 5
R
(i+1)
7 {R
(i)
7 },{s
(i)
21 , R
(i)
6 , s
(i)
6 },{s
(i)
22 , R
(i)
8 , s
(i)
7 },{s
(i)
12 , R
(i)
9 },{s
(i)
10 , R
(i)
5 } 5
R
(i+1)
8 {R
(i)
8 },{s
(i)
22 , R
(i)
7 , s
(i)
7 },{s
(i)
23 , R
(i)
9 , s
(i)
8 },{s
(i)
13 , R
(i)
10 },{s
(i)
11 , R
(i)
6 } 5
R
(i+1)
9 {R
(i)
9 },{s
(i)
23 , R
(i)
8 , s
(i)
8 },{s
(i)
24 , R
(i)
10 , s
(i)
9 },{s
(i)
14 , R
(i)
11 },{s
(i)
12 , R
(i)
7 } 5
R
(i+1)
10 {R
(i)
10 },{s
(i)
24 , R
(i)
9 , s
(i)
9 },{s
(i)
25 , R
(i)
11 , s
(i)
10 },{s
(i)
15 , R
(i)
12 },{s
(i)
13 , R
(i)
8 } 5
R
(i+1)
11 {R
(i)
11 },{s
(i)
25 , R
(i)
10 , s
(i)
10 },{s
(i)
26 , R
(i)
12 , s
(i)
11 },{s
(i)
16 , R
(i)
13 },{s
(i)
14 , R
(i)
9 } 5
R
(i+1)
12 {R
(i)
12 },{s
(i)
26 , R
(i)
11 , s
(i)
11 },{s
(i)
27 , R
(i)
13 , s
(i)
12 },{s
(i)
15 , R
(i)
10 } 4
R
(i+1)
13 {R
(i)
13 },{s
(i)
27 , R
(i)
12 , s
(i)
12 },{s
(i)
16 , R
(i)
11 } 3
B State variables and theirs paths of ENOCORO-128v2
with T = 16
State Var. Paths Num.
a
(i+1)
0 {a
(i)
0 },{b
(i)
3 , e
(i)
0 },{f
(i)
0 , b
(i)
0 } 3
a
(i+1)
1 {a
(i)
1 },{b
(i)
4 , e
(i)
1 },{f
(i)
1 , b
(i)
1 },{g
(i)
0 , d
(i)
0 } 4
a
(i+1)
2 {a
(i)
2 },{b
(i)
5 , e
(i)
2 },{f
(i)
2 , b
(i)
2 },{g
(i)
1 , d
(i)
1 } 4
a
(i+1)
3 {a
(i)
3 },{b
(i)
6 , e
(i)
3 },{f
(i)
3 , b
(i)
3 },{g
(i)
2 , d
(i)
2 } 4
a
(i+1)
4 {a
(i)
4 },{b
(i)
7 , e
(i)
4 },{f
(i)
4 , b
(i)
4 },{g
(i)
3 , d
(i)
3 } 4
a
(i+1)
5 {a
(i)
5 },{b
(i)
8 , e
(i)
5 },{f
(i)
5 , b
(i)
5 },{g
(i)
4 , d
(i)
4 } 4
a
(i+1)
6 {a
(i)
6 },{b
(i)
9 , e
(i)
6 },{f
(i)
6 , b
(i)
6 },{g
(i)
5 , d
(i)
5 } 4
a
(i+1)
7 {a
(i)
7 },{b
(i)
10 , e
(i)
7 },{f
(i)
7 , b
(i)
7 },{g
(i)
6 , d
(i)
6 } 4
a
(i+1)
8 {a
(i)
8 },{b
(i)
11 , e
(i)
8 },{f
(i)
8 , b
(i)
8 },{g
(i)
7 , d
(i)
7 } 4
a
(i+1)
9 {a
(i)
9 },{b
(i)
12 , e
(i)
9 },{f
(i)
9 , b
(i)
9 },{g
(i)
8 , d
(i)
8 } 4
a
(i+1)
10 {a
(i)
10 },{b
(i)
13 , e
(i)
10 },{f
(i)
10 , b
(i)
10 },{g
(i)
9 , d
(i)
9 } 4
a
(i+1)
11 {a
(i)
11 },{b
(i)
14 , e
(i)
11 },{f
(i)
11 , b
(i)
11 },{g
(i)
10 , d
(i)
10 } 4
a
(i+1)
12 {a
(i)
12 },{f
(i)
12 , b
(i)
12 },{g
(i)
11 , d
(i)
11 } 3
a
(i+1)
13 {a
(i)
13 },{f
(i)
13 , b
(i)
13 },{g
(i)
12 , d
(i)
12 } 3
a
(i+1)
14 {a
(i)
14 },{f
(i)
14 , b
(i)
14 },{g
(i)
13 , d
(i)
13 } 3
a
(i+1)
15 {a
(i)
15 },{g
(i)
14 , d
(i)
14 } 2
b
(i+1)
0 {b
(i)
0 },{c
(i)
5 , c
(i)
1 },{f
(i)
0 , a
(i)
0 } 3
b
(i+1)
1 {b
(i)
1 },{c
(i)
6 , c
(i)
2 },{f
(i)
1 , a
(i)
1 } 3
b
(i+1)
2 {b
(i)
2 },{c
(i)
7 , c
(i)
3 },{f
(i)
2 , a
(i)
2 } 3
b
(i+1)
3 {b
(i)
3 },{a
(i)
0 , e
(i)
0 },{c
(i)
8 , c
(i)
4 },{f
(i)
3 , a
(i)
3 } 4
b
(i+1)
4 {b
(i)
4 },{a
(i)
1 , e
(i)
1 },{c
(i)
9 , c
(i)
5 },{f
(i)
4 , a
(i)
4 } 4
b
(i+1)
5 {b
(i)
5 },{a
(i)
2 , e
(i)
2 },{c
(i)
10 , c
(i)
6 },{f
(i)
5 , a
(i)
5 } 4
b
(i+1)
6 {b
(i)
6 },{a
(i)
3 , e
(i)
3 },{c
(i)
11 , c
(i)
7 },{f
(i)
6 , a
(i)
6 } 4
b
(i+1)
7 {b
(i)
7 },{a
(i)
4 , e
(i)
4 },{c
(i)
12 , c
(i)
8 },{f
(i)
7 , a
(i)
7 } 4
b
(i+1)
8 {b
(i)
8 },{a
(i)
5 , e
(i)
5 },{c
(i)
13 , c
(i)
9 },{f
(i)
8 , a
(i)
8 } 4
b
(i+1)
9 {b
(i)
9 },{a
(i)
6 , e
(i)
6 },{c
(i)
14 , c
(i)
10 },{f
(i)
9 , a
(i)
9 } 4
b
(i+1)
10 {b
(i)
10 },{a
(i)
7 , e
(i)
7 },{f
(i)
10 , a
(i)
10 } 3
b
(i+1)
11 {b
(i)
11 },{a
(i)
8 , e
(i)
8 },{f
(i)
11 , a
(i)
11 } 3
b
(i+1)
12 {b
(i)
12 },{a
(i)
9 , e
(i)
9 },{f
(i)
12 , a
(i)
12 } 3
b
(i+1)
13 {b
(i)
13 },{a
(i)
10 , e
(i)
10 },{f
(i)
13 , a
(i)
13 } 3
b
(i+1)
14 {b
(i)
14 },{a
(i)
11 , e
(i)
11 },{f
(i)
14 , a
(i)
14 } 3
c
(i+1)
0 {c
(i)
0 },{d
(i)
9 , d
(i)
1 },{f
(i)
0 , g
(i)
0 },{g
(i)
0 , e
(i)
2 },{f
(i)
0 , e
(i)
2 } 5
c
(i+1)
1 {c
(i)
1 },{c
(i)
5 , b
(i)
0 },{d
(i)
10 , d
(i)
2 },{f
(i)
1 , g
(i)
1 },{g
(i)
1 , e
(i)
3 },{f
(i)
1 , e
(i)
3 } 6
c
(i+1)
2 {c
(i)
2 },{c
(i)
6 , b
(i)
1 },{d
(i)
11 , d
(i)
3 },{f
(i)
2 , g
(i)
2 },{g
(i)
2 , e
(i)
4 },{f
(i)
2 , e
(i)
4 } 6
c
(i+1)
3 {c
(i)
3 },{c
(i)
7 , b
(i)
2 },{d
(i)
12 , d
(i)
4 },{f
(i)
3 , g
(i)
3 },{g
(i)
3 , e
(i)
5 },{f
(i)
3 , e
(i)
5 } 6
c
(i+1)
4 {c
(i)
4 },{c
(i)
8 , b
(i)
3 },{d
(i)
13 , d
(i)
5 },{f
(i)
4 , g
(i)
4 },{g
(i)
4 , e
(i)
6 },{f
(i)
4 , e
(i)
6 } 6
c
(i+1)
5 {c
(i)
5 },{b
(i)
0 , c
(i)
1 },{c
(i)
9 , b
(i)
4 },{d
(i)
14 , d
(i)
6 },{f
(i)
5 , g
(i)
5 },{g
(i)
5 , e
(i)
7 },{f
(i)
5 , e
(i)
7 } 7
c
(i+1)
6 {c
(i)
6 },{b
(i)
1 , c
(i)
2 },{c
(i)
10 , b
(i)
5 },{f
(i)
6 , g
(i)
6 },{g
(i)
6 , e
(i)
8 },{f
(i)
6 , e
(i)
8 } 6
c
(i+1)
7 {c
(i)
7 },{b
(i)
2 , c
(i)
3 },{c
(i)
11 , b
(i)
6 },{f
(i)
7 , g
(i)
7 },{g
(i)
7 , e
(i)
9 },{f
(i)
7 , e
(i)
9 } 6
c
(i+1)
8 {c
(i)
8 },{b
(i)
3 , c
(i)
4 },{c
(i)
12 , b
(i)
7 },{f
(i)
8 , g
(i)
8 },{g
(i)
8 , e
(i)
10 },{f
(i)
8 , e
(i)
10 } 6
c
(i+1)
9 {c
(i)
9 },{b
(i)
4 , c
(i)
5 },{c
(i)
13 , b
(i)
8 },{f
(i)
9 , g
(i)
9 },{g
(i)
9 , e
(i)
11 },{f
(i)
9 , e
(i)
11 } 6
c
(i+1)
10 {c
(i)
10 },{b
(i)
5 , c
(i)
6 },{c
(i)
14 , b
(i)
9 },{f
(i)
10 , g
(i)
10 },{g
(i)
10 , e
(i)
12 },{f
(i)
10 , e
(i)
12 } 6
State Var. Paths Num.
c
(i+1)
11 {c
(i)
11 },{b
(i)
6 , c
(i)
7 },{f
(i)
11 , g
(i)
11 },{g
(i)
11 , e
(i)
13 },{f
(i)
11 , e
(i)
13 } 5
c
(i+1)
12 {c
(i)
12 },{b
(i)
7 , c
(i)
8 },{f
(i)
12 , g
(i)
12 },{g
(i)
12 , e
(i)
14 },{f
(i)
12 , e
(i)
14 } 5
c
(i+1)
13 {c
(i)
13 },{b
(i)
8 , c
(i)
9 },{f
(i)
13 , g
(i)
13 },{g
(i)
13 , e
(i)
15 },{f
(i)
13 , e
(i)
15 } 5
c
(i+1)
14 {c
(i)
14 },{b
(i)
9 , c
(i)
10 },{f
(i)
14 , g
(i)
14 },{g
(i)
14 , e
(i)
16 },{f
(i)
14 , e
(i)
16 } 5
d
(i+1)
0 {d
(i)
0 },{e
(i)
15 , e
(i)
3 },{g
(i)
0 , a
(i)
1 } 3
d
(i+1)
1 {d
(i)
1 },{d
(i)
9 , c
(i)
0 },{e
(i)
16 , e
(i)
4 },{g
(i)
1 , a
(i)
2 } 4
d
(i+1)
2 {d
(i)
2 },{d
(i)
10 , c
(i)
1 },{g
(i)
2 , a
(i)
3 } 3
d
(i+1)
3 {d
(i)
3 },{d
(i)
11 , c
(i)
2 },{g
(i)
3 , a
(i)
4 } 3
d
(i+1)
4 {d
(i)
4 },{d
(i)
12 , c
(i)
3 },{g
(i)
4 , a
(i)
5 } 3
d
(i+1)
5 {d
(i)
5 },{d
(i)
13 , c
(i)
4 },{g
(i)
5 , a
(i)
6 } 3
d
(i+1)
6 {d
(i)
6 },{d
(i)
14 , c
(i)
5 },{g
(i)
6 , a
(i)
7 } 3
d
(i+1)
7 {d
(i)
7 },{g
(i)
7 , a
(i)
8 } 2
d
(i+1)
8 {d
(i)
8 },{g
(i)
8 , a
(i)
9 } 2
d
(i+1)
9 {d
(i)
9 },{c
(i)
0 , d
(i)
1 },{g
(i)
9 , a
(i)
10 } 3
d
(i+1)
10 {d
(i)
10 },{c
(i)
1 , d
(i)
2 },{g
(i)
10 , a
(i)
11 } 3
d
(i+1)
11 {d
(i)
11 },{c
(i)
2 , d
(i)
3 },{g
(i)
11 , a
(i)
12 } 3
d
(i+1)
12 {d
(i)
12 },{c
(i)
3 , d
(i)
4 },{g
(i)
12 , a
(i)
13 } 3
d
(i+1)
13 {d
(i)
13 },{c
(i)
4 , d
(i)
5 },{g
(i)
13 , a
(i)
14 } 3
d
(i+1)
14 {d
(i)
14 },{c
(i)
5 , d
(i)
6 },{g
(i)
14 , a
(i)
15 } 3
e
(i+1)
0 {e
(i)
0 },{b
(i)
3 , a
(i)
0 } 2
e
(i+1)
1 {e
(i)
1 },{b
(i)
4 , a
(i)
1 } 2
e
(i+1)
2 {e
(i)
2 },{b
(i)
5 , a
(i)
2 },{f
(i)
0 , g
(i)
0 },{g
(i)
0 , c
(i)
0 },{f
(i)
0 , c
(i)
0 } 5
e
(i+1)
3 {e
(i)
3 },{b
(i)
6 , a
(i)
3 },{e
(i)
15 , d
(i)
0 },{f
(i)
1 , g
(i)
1 },{g
(i)
1 , c
(i)
1 },{f
(i)
1 , c
(i)
1 } 6
e
(i+1)
4 {e
(i)
4 },{b
(i)
7 , a
(i)
4 },{e
(i)
16 , d
(i)
1 },{f
(i)
2 , g
(i)
2 },{g
(i)
2 , c
(i)
2 },{f
(i)
2 , c
(i)
2 } 6
e
(i+1)
5 {e
(i)
5 },{b
(i)
8 , a
(i)
5 },{f
(i)
3 , g
(i)
3 },{g
(i)
3 , c
(i)
3 },{f
(i)
3 , c
(i)
3 } 5
e
(i+1)
6 {e
(i)
6 },{b
(i)
9 , a
(i)
6 },{f
(i)
4 , g
(i)
4 },{g
(i)
4 , c
(i)
4 },{f
(i)
4 , c
(i)
4 } 5
e
(i+1)
7 {e
(i)
7 },{b
(i)
10 , a
(i)
7 },{f
(i)
5 , g
(i)
5 },{g
(i)
5 , c
(i)
5 },{f
(i)
5 , c
(i)
5 } 5
e
(i+1)
8 {e
(i)
8 },{b
(i)
11 , a
(i)
8 },{f
(i)
6 , g
(i)
6 },{g
(i)
6 , c
(i)
6 },{f
(i)
6 , c
(i)
6 } 5
e
(i+1)
9 {e
(i)
9 },{b
(i)
12 , a
(i)
9 },{f
(i)
7 , g
(i)
7 },{g
(i)
7 , c
(i)
7 },{f
(i)
7 , c
(i)
7 } 5
e
(i+1)
10 {e
(i)
10 },{b
(i)
13 , a
(i)
10 },{f
(i)
8 , g
(i)
8 },{g
(i)
8 , c
(i)
8 },{f
(i)
8 , c
(i)
8 } 5
e
(i+1)
11 {e
(i)
11 },{b
(i)
14 , a
(i)
11 },{f
(i)
9 , g
(i)
9 },{g
(i)
9 , c
(i)
9 },{f
(i)
9 , c
(i)
9 } 5
e
(i+1)
12 {e
(i)
12 },{f
(i)
10 , g
(i)
10 },{g
(i)
10 , c
(i)
10 },{f
(i)
10 , c
(i)
10 } 4
e
(i+1)
13 {e
(i)
13 },{f
(i)
11 , g
(i)
11 },{g
(i)
11 , c
(i)
11 },{f
(i)
11 , c
(i)
11 } 4
e
(i+1)
14 {e
(i)
14 },{f
(i)
12 , g
(i)
12 },{g
(i)
12 , c
(i)
12 },{f
(i)
12 , c
(i)
12 } 4
e
(i+1)
15 {e
(i)
15 },{d
(i)
0 , e
(i)
3 },{f
(i)
13 , g
(i)
13 },{g
(i)
13 , c
(i)
13 },{f
(i)
13 , c
(i)
13 } 5
e
(i+1)
16 {e
(i)
16 },{d
(i)
1 , e
(i)
4 },{f
(i)
14 , g
(i)
14 },{g
(i)
14 , c
(i)
14 },{f
(i)
14 , c
(i)
14 } 5
f
(i+1)
0 {f
(i)
0 },{a
(i)
0 , b
(i)
0 },{g
(i)
0 , e
(i)
2 },{g
(i)
0 , c
(i)
0 },{e
(i)
2 , c
(i)
0 } 5
f
(i+1)
1 {f
(i)
1 },{a
(i)
1 , b
(i)
1 },{g
(i)
1 , e
(i)
3 },{g
(i)
1 , c
(i)
1 },{e
(i)
3 , c
(i)
1 } 5
f
(i+1)
2 {f
(i)
2 },{a
(i)
2 , b
(i)
2 },{g
(i)
2 , e
(i)
4 },{g
(i)
2 , c
(i)
2 },{e
(i)
4 , c
(i)
2 } 5
f
(i+1)
3 {f
(i)
3 },{a
(i)
3 , b
(i)
3 },{g
(i)
3 , e
(i)
5 },{g
(i)
3 , c
(i)
3 },{e
(i)
5 , c
(i)
3 } 5
f
(i+1)
4 {f
(i)
4 },{a
(i)
4 , b
(i)
4 },{g
(i)
4 , e
(i)
6 },{g
(i)
4 , c
(i)
4 },{e
(i)
6 , c
(i)
4 } 5
f
(i+1)
5 {f
(i)
5 },{a
(i)
5 , b
(i)
5 },{g
(i)
5 , e
(i)
7 },{g
(i)
5 , c
(i)
5 },{e
(i)
7 , c
(i)
5 } 5
State Var. Paths Num.
f
(i+1)
6 {f
(i)
6 },{a
(i)
6 , b
(i)
6 },{g
(i)
6 , e
(i)
8 },{g
(i)
6 , c
(i)
6 },{e
(i)
8 , c
(i)
6 } 5
f
(i+1)
7 {f
(i)
7 },{a
(i)
7 , b
(i)
7 },{g
(i)
7 , e
(i)
9 },{g
(i)
7 , c
(i)
7 },{e
(i)
9 , c
(i)
7 } 5
f
(i+1)
8 {f
(i)
8 },{a
(i)
8 , b
(i)
8 },{g
(i)
8 , e
(i)
10 },{g
(i)
8 , c
(i)
8 },{e
(i)
10 , c
(i)
8 } 5
f
(i+1)
9 {f
(i)
9 },{a
(i)
9 , b
(i)
9 },{g
(i)
9 , e
(i)
11 },{g
(i)
9 , c
(i)
9 },{e
(i)
11 , c
(i)
9 } 5
f
(i+1)
10 {f
(i)
10 },{a
(i)
10 , b
(i)
10 },{g
(i)
10 , e
(i)
12 },{g
(i)
10 , c
(i)
10 },{e
(i)
12 , c
(i)
10 } 5
f
(i+1)
11 {f
(i)
11 },{a
(i)
11 , b
(i)
11 },{g
(i)
11 , e
(i)
13 },{g
(i)
11 , c
(i)
11 },{e
(i)
13 , c
(i)
11 } 5
f
(i+1)
12 {f
(i)
12 },{a
(i)
12 , b
(i)
12 },{g
(i)
12 , e
(i)
14 },{g
(i)
12 , c
(i)
12 },{e
(i)
14 , c
(i)
12 } 5
f
(i+1)
13 {f
(i)
13 },{a
(i)
13 , b
(i)
13 },{g
(i)
13 , e
(i)
15 },{g
(i)
13 , c
(i)
13 },{e
(i)
15 , c
(i)
13 } 5
f
(i+1)
14 {f
(i)
14 },{a
(i)
14 , b
(i)
14 },{g
(i)
14 , e
(i)
16 },{g
(i)
14 , c
(i)
14 },{e
(i)
16 , c
(i)
14 } 5
g
(i+1)
0 {g
(i)
0 },{d
(i)
0 , a
(i)
1 },{f
(i)
0 , e
(i)
2 },{f
(i)
0 , c
(i)
0 },{e
(i)
2 , c
(i)
0 } 5
g
(i+1)
1 {g
(i)
1 },{d
(i)
1 , a
(i)
2 },{f
(i)
1 , e
(i)
3 },{f
(i)
1 , c
(i)
1 },{e
(i)
3 , c
(i)
1 } 5
g
(i+1)
2 {g
(i)
2 },{d
(i)
2 , a
(i)
3 },{f
(i)
2 , e
(i)
4 },{f
(i)
2 , c
(i)
2 },{e
(i)
4 , c
(i)
2 } 5
g
(i+1)
3 {g
(i)
3 },{d
(i)
3 , a
(i)
4 },{f
(i)
3 , e
(i)
5 },{f
(i)
3 , c
(i)
3 },{e
(i)
5 , c
(i)
3 } 5
g
(i+1)
4 {g
(i)
4 },{d
(i)
4 , a
(i)
5 },{f
(i)
4 , e
(i)
6 },{f
(i)
4 , c
(i)
4 },{e
(i)
6 , c
(i)
4 } 5
g
(i+1)
5 {g
(i)
5 },{d
(i)
5 , a
(i)
6 },{f
(i)
5 , e
(i)
7 },{f
(i)
5 , c
(i)
5 },{e
(i)
7 , c
(i)
5 } 5
g
(i+1)
6 {g
(i)
6 },{d
(i)
6 , a
(i)
7 },{f
(i)
6 , e
(i)
8 },{f
(i)
6 , c
(i)
6 },{e
(i)
8 , c
(i)
6 } 5
g
(i+1)
7 {g
(i)
7 },{d
(i)
7 , a
(i)
8 },{f
(i)
7 , e
(i)
9 },{f
(i)
7 , c
(i)
7 },{e
(i)
9 , c
(i)
7 } 5
g
(i+1)
8 {g
(i)
8 },{d
(i)
8 , a
(i)
9 },{f
(i)
8 , e
(i)
10 },{f
(i)
8 , c
(i)
8 },{e
(i)
10 , c
(i)
8 } 5
g
(i+1)
9 {g
(i)
9 },{d
(i)
9 , a
(i)
10 },{f
(i)
9 , e
(i)
11 },{f
(i)
9 , c
(i)
9 },{e
(i)
11 , c
(i)
9 } 5
g
(i+1)
10 {g
(i)
10 },{d
(i)
10 , a
(i)
11 },{f
(i)
10 , e
(i)
12 },{f
(i)
10 , c
(i)
10 },{e
(i)
12 , c
(i)
10 } 5
g
(i+1)
11 {g
(i)
11 },{d
(i)
11 , a
(i)
12 },{f
(i)
11 , e
(i)
13 },{f
(i)
11 , c
(i)
11 },{e
(i)
13 , c
(i)
11 } 5
g
(i+1)
12 {g
(i)
12 },{d
(i)
12 , a
(i)
13 },{f
(i)
12 , e
(i)
14 },{f
(i)
12 , c
(i)
12 },{e
(i)
14 , c
(i)
12 } 5
g
(i+1)
13 {g
(i)
13 },{d
(i)
13 , a
(i)
14 },{f
(i)
13 , e
(i)
15 },{f
(i)
13 , c
(i)
13 },{e
(i)
15 , c
(i)
13 } 5
g
(i+1)
14 {g
(i)
14 },{d
(i)
14 , a
(i)
15 },{f
(i)
14 , e
(i)
16 },{f
(i)
14 , c
(i)
14 },{e
(i)
16 , c
(i)
14 } 5
